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Talking Foreign Policy: North 
Korea Summit 
“Talking Foreign Policy” is a one-hour radio program, 
hosted by the Dean of Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law, Michael Scharf, in which experts discuss the important 
foreign policy issues. The premier broadcast (airdate: March 1, 
2012) covered the controversial use of predator drones, 
humanitarian intervention in Syria, and responding to Iran’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Subsequent broadcasts have 
covered topics such as the challenges of bringing indicted tyrants 
to justice, America’s Afghanistan exit strategy, the issue of 
presidential power in a war without end, and President Obama’s 
second term foreign policy team.  This broadcast focused on the 
U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Summit.……………………………………………….  
 
The purpose of the radio show is to cover some of the most 
salient foreign policy topics and discuss them in a way that can 
make it easier for listeners to grasp. “Talking Foreign Policy” is 
recorded in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream studio, Cleveland’s 
NPR affiliate. Michael Scharf is joined each session with a few 
expert colleagues known for their ability to discuss complex 
topics in an easy-to-digest manner: 
• The ethicist: Shannon French, director of Case Western 
Reserve’s Inamori Center for Ethics and Excellence; 
• The Asian Studies expert: Professor Tim Webster, the 
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve 
University;  
• The international law guru: Milena Sterio, Associate Dean of 
The Cleveland Marshall College of Law; and 
• The negotiator: Paul R. Williams, president of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group. 
 
Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of 
“Talking Foreign Policy” are available at: 
https://law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy.  The transcript of 
the May 24, 2018 broadcast appears below. 
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Talking Foreign Policy: North Korea Summit 
May 24, 2018 broadcast1 
MICHAEL SCHARF: The United States and North Korea — two 
countries that fought a brutal war and never made peace. No sitting 
U.S. President has met with his North Korean counter-part;2 but a 
few months ago, North Korean president Kim Jong-un warned that 
the whole of the United States was in range of his country’s nuclear 
weapons, and President Trump responded by calling Kim “Little 
Rocket Man” and threatening to annihilate his nation.3 Then, in a 
dramatic turnabout in March, the two leaders agreed to hold a 
historic Presidential Summit.4 But on May 24th, President Trump 
announced that the Summit was off.5 In this broadcast of Talking 
Foreign Policy, we’ve assembled a panel of experts on peace 
negotiations, national security, human rights, and Asian affairs to 
discuss the prospects and pitfalls for a U.S. - North Korea Summit, 
right after the news.  
Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host Michael 
Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. In 
this broadcast, our expert panelists will be discussing the prospects 
for a U.S.-North Korea Summit. For our program today, we’ve 
assembled a panel of experts on peace negotiations, national security, 
 
1. Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Emma 
Lawson, Alexander Peters, Courtney Koski, and Senior Cox Center 
Fellow Alexandra Mooney. 
2. Robbie Gramer & Emily Tamkin, Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with 
North Korea: A Timeline, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 12, 2018, 6:48 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/12/a-timeline-of-u-s-negotiations-
talks-with-north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-pyongyang-nuclear-weapons-
diplomacy-asia-security/. 
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2017, 7:25 
AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/936209447747190784?ref_
src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E93620944
7747190784&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.latimes.com%2Fpolitics%
2Fla-pol-updates-everything-president-trump-calls-kim-jong-un-little-
rocket-1512093131-htmlstory.html. 
4. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
5. Mark Landler, Trump Pulls Out of North Korea Summit Meeting with 
Kim Jong-un, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/asia/north-korea-trump-
summit.html. Trump subsequently changed his mind and the Summit 
was held on June 11, 2018 2018. For a summary of the Summit, see 
David Jackson, US-North Korea Summit, USA TODAY (June 12, 2018), 
available at 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/11/singapore-
donald-trump-kim-jong-un-denuclearization-summit/689817002/. 
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human rights, and North Korean-U.S. diplomacy. Joining us from a 
studio in Washington D.C. is Dr. Paul Williams, 6 the president of the 
Public International Law and Policy Group—a Nobel Peace Prize 
nominated NGO that has provided legal counsel in a dozen peace 
negotiations over the past twenty-two years.7 Welcome to the show 
Paul!  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Thanks, Michael. It’s my pleasure.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And in our studio in Cleveland, I’m joined by Dr. 
Shannon French,8 a former faculty member of the U.S. Naval 
Academy who now directs the Inamori International Center for Ethics 
and Excellence at Case Western Reserve University. She’s also 
director of the nation’s first ever master’s program in Military Ethics.9 
Thanks for being with us, Shannon.  
 
SHANNON FRENCH: Thanks, Michael. Happy to be here.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Also here with me is Professor Milena Sterio,10 the 
Associate Dean of Cleveland Marshall College of Law and renowned 
international law expert. It’s good to see you again, Milena.  
 
6. Paul Williams, Faculty, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE 
OF LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/pwilliams/ (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2019). Paul R. Williams holds the Rebecca I. Grazier 
Professorship in Law and International Relations at American 
University. Professor Williams teaches at the School of International 
Service and the Washington College of Law and also directs the joint 
JD/MA program in International Relations. Prior to his arrival at 
American University, Paul Williams served as a Senior Associate with 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fulbright 
Research Scholar at the University of Cambridge. 
7. PILPG, available at 
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2019). 
8. Shannon E. French, Ph.D., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, 
https://case.edu/inamori/about-the-center/staff/shannon-french (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2019). Prior to her involvement in CWRU School of Law, 
Shannon French taught ethics for eleven years at the United States 
Naval Academy and served as Associate Chair of the Department of 
Leadership, Ethics, and Law. 
9. Master of Arts in Military Ethics at Case Western Reserve University, 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, http://militaryethics.case.edu/ 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
10. Milena Sterio, CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://facultyprofile.csuohio.edu/csufacultyprofile/detail.cfm?FacultyID
=M_STERIO (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). Before joining Cleveland-
Marshall, Milena Sterio worked as an associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Talking Foreign Policy: North Korea Summit 
240 
MILENA STERIO: It is great to be here.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And, finally, we have Professor Tim Webster,11 the 
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve 
University. Welcome, Tim.  
 
TIM WEBSTER: Thank you, Michael.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let’s begin with a short refresher on U.S.-North 
Korean relations. When the Korean conflict ended in 1953, there was 
no peace agreement—only an armistice.12 Milena, as an international 
law expert, can you tell us the implications of that?  
 
MILENA STERIO: Sure. So, the Korean armistice agreement, which was 
signed in 1953, was an agreement signed by the armies of North 
Korea, China, and the United States, and that brought an end to the 
hostilities to the war that was going on in Korea at the time.13 
However, it was not a peace treaty signed by the respected 
governments. Meaning that there were lots of unresolved issues that 
did not end with the armistice.14  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And then in the aftermath, there was a massive 
military build-up on both sides. There were landmines placed in the 
demilitarized zone, and there was a lot of negative rhetoric, right?15  
 
 
Steen & Hamilton in New York City and as an Adjunct Law Professor 
at Cornell. 
11. Timothy Webster, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 
LAW, https://law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our-
Faculty/Faculty-Detail/id/1020 (last visited Jan 1, 2019). Before joining 
Case, Timothy Webster was a lecturer at Yale Law School and senior 
fellow at its China Law Center. He has held visiting professorships at 
the University of Paris—Dauphine, National Taiwan University, and 
Southwest University of Political Science and Law (Chongqing, China). 
12. Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State 
(1953), OUR DOCUMENTS, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=85 (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Joori Roh & Josh Smith, North, South Korea Begin Removing 
Landmines Along Fortified Border, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2018, 11:22 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-dmz/north-
south-korea-begin-removing-landmines-along-fortified-border-
idUSKCN1MB1BG. 
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MILENA STERIO: Exactly, and there was supposed to be a peace 
treaty. The idea at the time was basically to end the conflict, sign the 
armistice, and then negotiate a peace treaty. The problem is that that 
peace treaty was never actually negotiated. So up to this date, there 
is no peace treaty for Korea.16  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let’s fast-forward to the year 2002. That’s the 
year that North Korea admitted to having a nuclear weapons 
program, and it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.17 Paul, can you tell us what the significance of that would be?  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, Michael, that was hugely significant. The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is essentially the cornerstone of 
global nuclear security.18 By exiting that treaty, North Korea was 
essentially signaling that it was going to go nuclear, so to speak; and 
it did.19 And by exiting the treaty, all bets for verification, for 
monitoring—those doors were all closed, and North Korea was 
essentially able to aggressively pursue its nuclear program.20  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well why would it want to do that?  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Deterrence? The end of the conflict between the 
U.S. and North Korea, as Milena had mentioned, was an armistice, it 
wasn’t a peace deal. American troops remain in great numbers in 
South Korea and have engaged in annual war gaming near the border.  
North Korea wanted to basically have a nuclear weapons capability in 
order to, one, protect itself; and two, to reshape the geo-political 
environment on the Korean peninsula and in Asia.21  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: It turns out, it wasn’t just bluffing, because in 
2006, North Korea announced its first successful nuclear weapons 
 
16. Edward Wong, Why Is the U.S. Wary of a Declaration to End the 
Korean War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/korea-peace-treaty-
trump-us.html. 
17. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, available at 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text.  
19. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
20. Id.  
21. Why Does North Korea Want Nukes, HERITAGE (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.heritage.org/insider/summer-2018-insider/why-does-north-
korea-want-nukes. 
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test.22 And in the following years, North Korea announced a number 
of additional successful tests, including the underground explosion of a 
hydrogen bomb.23 Then it turned to testing long-range missiles.24 
Milena and Paul, how did the international community respond to 
these developments?  
 
MILENA STERIO: One of the things that happened is that the United 
Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions related to North 
Korea. There actually have been a total of twenty-one resolutions on 
North Korea since the 1950s, but nine resolutions which imposed 
crippling sanctions against North Korea over the past twelve years or 
so, the last of which was just a few months ago.25 The sanctions ended 
up being tightened up over the years and imposed on several sectors 
of the North Korean economy, including on North Korean exports. 
And the idea, obviously, of sanctions is to try to persuade without use 
of force the North Korean government to cease and desist from 
developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So that was the stick. Paul, can you tell us about 
any carrots that were attempted?  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yeah, in addition to the sticks that Milena had 
mentioned, the international community launched the six-party 
talks—which included the United States, North Korea, South Korea, 
as well as China, Japan, and Russia.26 And it was an off and on 
negotiation—and I should note that when the negotiations were off, 
the North Koreans were testing their nuclear weapons, their missiles, 
their rockets.27 And in fact, just a year prior to the announcement of 
these talks, the North Koreans had done significant testing.28 And 
every year since 2013, they’ve tested their nuclear weapons capability 
or further refined it, while at the same time saying they were 
interested in negotiations and talks to end that program.29   
22. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Kelsey Davenport, UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, 
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (last updated Jan. 2018), 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-
Resolutions-on-North-Korea. 
26. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Kelsey Davenport, Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and 
Missile Diplomacy: 2013, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (last updated Dec. 
2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2013. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright. So, then after Donald Trump was 
elected president, the leaders of the two countries began to use ever 
more threatening rhetoric in their conversation over Twitter and press 
releases. Let me provide a few quotes to give the listening audience an 
idea of what I’m talking about. So first, the president of North Korea, 
Kim Jong-un, he said:  
The whole of the US mainland is within our nuclear strike 
range. The nuclear button is always on my table. The US must 
realize that this is not a threat, but reality.30  
Now, Donald Trump responds:  
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un just said the ‘nuclear button 
is on his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted, food 
starved regime please inform him that I too have a button, but 
it is a much bigger and more powerful one than his, and my 
button works!31 
Trump also said, “Kim Jong-un of North Korea, who is obviously 
a mad man who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people, will be 
tested like never before!”32 And Kim responded, “I will surely and 
definitely tame the deranged US dotard with fire.”33 And at that 
point a lot of people looked up the word “dotard.” [Laughter] Trump 
then responds, “They will be met with fire and fury like the world has 
never seen.”34 And now, let me asks the panelists, how unusual is this 
 
30. Bruce Harrison et al., Kim Highlights ‘nuclear button’ On His Desk, 
Offers Olympic Talks, NBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2017, 9:58 PM) 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/kim-says-north-korea-s-
nuclear-weapons-will-prevent-war-n833781 (last visited Nov 4, 2018). 
31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:49 
PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/948355557022420992?lang
=en. 
32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2017, 5:28 
AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/911175246853664768?ref_
src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E91117524
6853664768&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2017%2F09%
2F22%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-north-korea-insults-
timeline%2Findex.html. 
33. Anna Fifield, Kim Jong Un Calls Trump a ‘mentally deranged U.S. 
Dotard’, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/21/nor
th-korean-leader-to-trump-i-will-surely-and-definitely-tame-the-mentally-
deranged-u-s-dotard-with-fire/. 
34. Jonathan Ernst, Trump Says North Korea Will Be Met with ‘fire and 
fury’ if it Threatens U.S., REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-
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kind of rhetoric to be coming from two presidents of sovereign 
countries in the world today? Anybody? Tim.  
 
TIM WEBSTER: Well, from North Korea’s side, it’s actually pretty 
common. This kind of bellicose, very floral, very over the top 
language is just sort of de rigueur, that’s the way they communicate. 
You can see this parodied in popular culture from Thirty Rock,35 the 
great TV show with Tina Fey, to The Interview, a movie starring 
James Franco and Seth Rogan.36 So, you know, it’s no surprise that 
North Korea uses this kind of language. What is surprising and what 
is sort of unprecedented, is that we have an American President 
playing along. Usually, they say nothing, or occasionally they’ll make 
an off the cuff insult. George Bush called Kim Jong-Il “a pygmy,”37 
you know, those kinds of things. But we’ve never seen this sort of 
back and forth, and of course Trump loves the drama. He loves the 
angst. He loves the limelight.  And that’s why you have this exchange 
of heightened and fiery rhetoric.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: How dangerous do you think this is? Shannon? 
 
SHANNON FRENCH: What bothers me is that it’s so petulant and 
undignified, and it seems to not take into account the moral weight of 
the kinds of decisions that are on the table here. So, it comes across 
like a game with schoolboys, but the stakes are too high for that.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, then on March 8th, in the middle of all this 
rhetoric, President Trump announces that he is willing to sit down 
with Kim Jong-un for a nuclear peace summit.38 Tim, as an Asian 
specialist, how do you explain the sudden turnabout?  
 
TIM WEBSTER: If you go back to the campaign trail, Trump said on a 
number of occasions that he would be willing to sit down and talk to 
Kim Jong-un.39 He said he wanted to open a dialogue, he said there 
 
trump/trump-says-north-korea-will-be-met-with-fire-and-fury-if-it-
threatens-u-s-idUSKBN1AO28O. 
35. 30 Rock (Universal Media Studios & Universal Television, Seasons 5 & 
6). 
36. THE INTERVIEW (Point Grey Pictures & LStar Capital 2014). 
37. Helene Cooper, Bush Writes to North Korean Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
6, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06cnd-
korea.html. 
38. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
39. Steven Holland & Emily Flitter, Exclusive: Trump Would Talk to North 
Korea’s Kim, Wants to Renegotiate Climate Accord, REUTERS (May 17, 
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was no problem with that. And in making that kind of 
pronouncement, Trump is doing just what Obama did when Obama 
was a candidate in 2008.40 Even towards the end of the Clinton 
administration in 2000, Clinton said, “I’m willing to go meet with 
Kim Jong-Il,” who was Kim Jong-un’s father. Clinton, of course sent 
his Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, who then met with Kim 
Jong-Il,41 but this would have been the first meeting between sitting 
presidents or sitting leaders of the two countries. So, was it a big 
turnabout? I think once it became clear that North Korea could 
actually hit the U.S. with a nuclear missile, that changed the stakes.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Shannon, how do you read it?  
 
SHANNON FRENCH: I agree that this move is in response to some of 
the technological advances by North Korea, but it also shows what I 
would almost want to call a weird kind of optimism on the part of 
President Trump—that he thinks he can make some kind of dramatic 
change or shift that we haven’t seen in the past, precisely by doing 
what hasn’t been done in the past. But, it ignores the lessons of 
history.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And Milena, do you take this at face value? Or are 
you more cynical? 
 
MILENA STERIO: You can go ahead and announce a big summit, but I 
think if you want to be successful, if you want to actually achieve 
something at that summit, almost all diplomacy experts would agree 
that there is a ton of work that would need to be done in advance of 
the summit. There is so much that would need to be pre-negotiated 
before the summit. So, to go ahead and announce that in two weeks 
the President of the United States is going to meet with the President 
of North Korea, it’s really posturing more than anything else. And it’s 
 
2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-
exclusive-idUSKCN0Y82JO. 
40. Bryon York, Obama, without Preconditions or Preparation, NATIONAL 
REVIEW (July 23, 2008, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/obama-without-preconditions-
or-preparation-byron-york/. 
41. Anna Fifield, David Nakamura & Seung Min Kim, Trump Accepts 
Invitation to Meet with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-korean-
leader-kim-jong-un-has-invited-president-trump-to-a-
meeting/2018/03/08/021cb070-2322-11e8-badd-
7c9f29a55815_story.html?utm_term=.e7f7c09400ad. 
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unrealistic to think that in such a short time frame, you can actually 
achieve a true peace treaty. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, you never really thought that the Summit was 
going to happen, or not on June 12 at least. 
 
MILENA STERIO: Well I either thought it wasn’t going to happen, or I 
thought if it does happen then nothing much will actually come out of 
it, and if anything Donald Trump could then say “you know, I tried. I 
went there and I tried, and they wouldn’t agree to anything.” 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So then on May 24th, President Trump, perhaps 
predictably, sent the following message to Kim Jong-un, and of course 
he released it for wide publication in every newspaper around the 
world: 
Sadly, based on the tremendous anger and open hostility 
displayed in your most recent statements, I feel that it is 
inappropriate at this time to have this long-planned meeting. 
Therefore, please let this letter represent that the Singapore 
Summit, for the good of both parties, but to the detriment of 
the world, will not take place.42 
Trump goes on to say, “You talk about your nuclear capabilities, 
but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God that they 
will never have to be used.”43 Kind of a thinly veiled threat there. 
Well when we return after our short break, our experts are going to 
tell us what they make of this latest turn of events, whether they 
think the summit ever will take place, and what’s at stake. We’ll be 
back in just a moment.  
---- [Station break] ---- 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought 
to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 idea 
stream. I’m Michael Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. I’m joined today by famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul 
Williams, military ethicist, Dr. Shannon French, international law 
guru, Associate Dean Melina Sterio, and an Asian Affairs expert, 
Professor Tim Webster. We’re talking today about the prospects of a 
U.S.-North Korean Summit. It’s really extraordinary that two 
countries with such acrimonious relations seem to be at the verge of 
 
42. David E. Sanger, Trump’s Letter to Kim Canceling North Korea 
Summit Meeting, Annotated, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/asia/read-trumps-letter-
to-kim-jong-un.html. 
43. Id. 
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actually holding peace talks. Let me begin with Tim Webster, and 
ask, assuming there is going to be a summit at some point, what 
would the United States be getting in return for agreeing to these 
talks?  
 
TIM WEBSTER: First a word about what Kim Jung-un gets.  When 
Donald Trump, or any other U.S. president stands next to and 
appears in a photo-op with the North Korean leader, that is of 
tremendous propaganda value for North Korea and for the idea that 
Kim Jung-un is of equal stature with the world’s great leaders. For 
Trump, the U.S. has for decades tried to denuclearize the Korean 
Peninsula. The long-term goal of the U.S. is the complete, verifiable, 
and irreversible denuclearization of the peninsula.44 Recently, Kim 
Jong-un had suggested that they would suspend missile launches, they 
would suspend nuclear tests, they would dismantle one of their 
nuclear test sites, which they actually did today, apparently, in view 
of journalists.45 So, those were sort of steps seen as a path forward to 
a total denuclearization. But with the tossing out of the Summit 
recently, it’s not clear that those will move forward. But the long-
term strategy, the long-term plan of the U.S., is the complete 
denuclearization of the peninsula.46  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, earlier in the broadcast, Paul Williams was 
telling us that back in 2002, when North Korea decided to start 
engaging in the development of nuclear weapons,47 North Korean 
leaders did that for their own protection. And I want to return to 
that thought with you, Paul. What was going on in the rest of the 
world that would have made North Korea feel that they needed 
nuclear weapons to protect themselves from the United States? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think the North Koreans have always been 
paranoid about their survivability. There was the end of the Cold 
War, there was the reduction of nuclear weapons stock piles around 
the globe, and there was a sense that there was a changing time and 
that, you know, the clock was running out for dictators like Muamar 
 
44. David Welna, ‘Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible’ A Tough Goal For 
North Korea Summit, NPR (June 6, 2018, 5:57 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192/complete-verifiable-
irreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summit. 
45. Reuters, North Korea Hosts Media to See Closing of Nuclear Site, N.Y. 
POST (May 23, 2018, 8:02 AM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/05/23/foreign-media-journey-to-see-north-
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Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Jong-ill , and that if they wanted 
to keep their family totalitarian regime going in North Korea, they 
needed some kind of bargaining chip to put on the table.48 And 
nuclear weapons were the most obvious.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, Paul, what about the rhetoric and events 
leading to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Do you think those played 
any role? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think it was very clear at the time that the 
United States was willing to engage in a regime change in order to 
protect its strategic interests. You know there was the actions in 
Afghanistan,49 the actions in Iraq,50 there was Libya giving up its 
nuclear weapons around that time in exchange for economic 
inducements,51 and the North Koreans simply thought “we need to go 
nuclear in order to preserve our quote unquote ‘way of life’” as they 
like to call it in North Korea. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, based on that, Paul, do you think there’s any 
real possibility that Kim Jong-un will actually give up all of his 
nuclear weapons, which seem to be not only the source of his power 
and security, but perhaps his very life?  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: No. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Care to elaborate?  
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Kim likes to put denuclearization on the table, and 
he often does that months before he conducts a dramatic test or a 
dramatic leap is made in their nuclear capacity. So, this whole notion 
of “oh we’re willing to denuclearize” came up quite often in the six-
party talks.52 It’s one of their talking points that they use to induce 
 
48. Erin Blakemore, Bill Clinton Once Struck a Nuclear Deal With North 
Korea, HISTORY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/north-
korea-nuclear-deal-bill-clinton-agreed-framework. 
49. U.S. Relations with Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm. 
50. Robert D. Kaplan & Rodger Baker, Why North Korea Needs Nukes, 
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/12/04/why-north-korea-
needs-nukes/#3dd478237d7b. 
51. Id. 
52. Kelsey Davenport, The Six-Party Talks at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N (last updated June 2018), 
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the United States. As Tim said, what does the United States want? It 
wants denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Kim says “Hey, I’ll 
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, can we have a summit, can we go 
to Singapore, can I get a photo-op, can I get sanctions lifted, can we 
enter into long and tortuous negotiations which will yield me both 
psychological as well as economic benefit?” But, it’s going to be very, 
very difficult for the North Koreans to give up those weapons if they 
want to continue the tyrannical regime that they use to govern or 
oppress their people.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well and there’s two ways that could go. One 
possibility is negotiations that go on and on and never bear fruit. The 
other is negotiations that bear fruit in terms of signing an agreement 
but then are cheated upon afterward.  And let me ask Milena, our 
expert in international law, based on past precedent, such as in Iraq 
and Libya, how could the U.S. ensure that a deal with North Korea 
was verifiable? What would happen if North Korea did cheat? 
 
MILENA STERIO: So, imagine a peace treaty, where North Korea 
agrees to gradually reduce and then destroy its arsenal of nuclear 
technology. There could be a verification inspection regime set up. It 
also depends if this is negotiated just between the United States and 
North Korea, or if there is an international organization involved. 
When it comes to other countries, there have been other international 
organizations involved in those verification inspection regimes. For 
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency53 and the 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organization.54 Those 
organizations can send inspectors to the relevant countries, and 
basically engage in inspection and verification. But that requires the 
agreement and cooperation by the relevant countries.55 So North 
Korea would have to accept those inspections, and if it cheated then 
sanctions could be re-imposed. If we’re talking about U.S. sanctions, 
then the U.S. government is obviously free to reimpose sanctions. If 
we’re talking about U.N. sanctions typically the Security Council 
would have to vote to reimpose sanctions.56  
 
53. Overview, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iaea.org/. 
54. Who We Are, PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE 
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORG., https://www.ctbto.org/. 
55. Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 241, 245 (1923).  
56. U.N. Charter art. 39-51. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Not too long ago, something like this was tried 
for Syria to take away its chemical weapons.57 How well did that 
work? 
 
MILENA STERIO: Right, there is precedent here. I think the North 
Koreans are focused not so much on Syria but on Iraq and Libya, 
which you already mentioned. From the North Korean perspective, 
they’re looking at Iraq and Libya, where there was an inspection 
regime put in place.58 You could make the argument that Gaddafi, 
the Libyan leader in 2003, really tried to respect the investigation and 
verification regime related to the destruction of his chemical weapons. 
Ultimately, that road resulted in regime change and Gaddafi’s 
death.59 As for Iraq, after Saddam Hussein was weakened by the 
Security Council obligations that Iraq undertook after the 1991 
Persian Gulf War, there was the 2003 U.S. invasion, and Saddam 
Hussein was ultimately convicted and put to death.60 From the North 
Korean perspective of looking at these precedents, I’m skeptical, like 
Paul, because I really don’t see what’s in it for them. Looking at these 
precedents, they might say, “Even if we agree now this might not 
work out for us so well.” 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, in both of those cases there was U.S. use of 
force. You were talking about reimposition of sanctions, but shouldn’t 
we also be talking about enforcement through force?  What if North 
Korea cheats, the U.S. could say, “Ah we gave them the chance, we 
entered into this treaty. They’ve cheated, and now we’re going to 
invade. Now we’re going to have forcible regime change?” 
 
MILENA STERIO: For the use of force in international law, there are 
basically only two situations when a country can legally use force 
against another sovereign country. Those two situations are: Security 
 
57. Russia, China block Security Council action on use of chemical weapons 
in Syria, UN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/552362-russia-china-block-
security-council-action-use-chemical-weapons-syria. 
 
58. Nigel Morris and Andrew Buncombe, Libya Gives Up Nuclear and 
Chemical Weapons, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 20, 2003), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/libya-gives-up-
nuclear-and-chemical-weapons-83350.html. 
59. Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 337, 353 (2007).  
60. This Day in History, December 13, 2003: Saddam Hussein Captured, 
HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/saddam-hussein-
captured (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
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Council authorization or self-defense.61 With Security Council 
authorization, the problem is we’re in this dynamic where Russia and 
China are often vetoing resolutions brought forth by the United 
States.62 With respect to North Korea, they might veto a resolution 
attempting to authorize the use of force against North Korea. In the 
other situation, self-defense, the United States would have to make 
the argument that North Korea, by not respecting the deal, whatever 
the deal is, is a threat to the United States and is about to somehow 
harm the United States. Then we can act in self-defense. That would 
have to be the legal argument. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, does it strengthen that legal argument to 
say, “Look, we tried everything. We tried negotiating a treaty, and 
they cheated. They’ve got these nuclear weapons, and we feel like our 
security is at stake. We’ve tried everything reasonable that anyone 
could, so now we’re going to resort to force?” Does that strengthen 
the argument? 
 
MILENA STERIO: If you could make the argument that North Korea 
was actually threatening to use nuclear weapons against the United 
States.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about all those quotes I read just a moment 
ago?  
 
MILENA STERIO: It depends on how seriously you’re going to take 
those quotes. Is that just posturing or is that actual, real, threats 
against the United States? They’re all sorts of creative self-defense 
arguments that have already been made by the United States. For 
example, with respect to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States 
made creative, sort of anticipatory self-defense arguments based on 
Iraq’s alleged possession of chemical weapons.63 And you can 
certainly, you know, go there again. But, legally speaking, I think it 
would be a difficult argument. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, we’ve been focusing on the nukes. But Paul 
and Tim, let me ask you—on the last broadcast of “Talking Foreign 
Policy,” we had former Judge of the International Court of Justice, 
Tom Buergenthal, on the air with us. He compared North Korea to 
 
61. U.N. Charter art. 4. 
62. Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Modern Threats and the United 
Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency (a Response to 
Professor Allen Weiner), 62 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (2010). 
63. Chris Bordelon, The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Self-Defense Under 
International Law, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 111, 111-112 (2005). 
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Nazi Germany in terms of its human rights abuses. If you remember, 
he said that he was part of a recent investigation of the human rights 
situation in North Korea.64 He said that the atrocities were worse 
than what happened to him when he was in a concentration camp 
during World War II in Nazi Germany. So, let me ask the two of you: 
should the U.S. be insisting, if we’re going to have talks with North 
Korea, that they include the human rights record as well as nukes? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes. They clearly should. The Americans should be 
insisting that these human rights violations be included in the talks, 
and that mechanisms be created in order to minimize or stop these 
human rights violations. We’re talking about mass starvation, 
concentration camps, extensive torture, and executions.65 But the 
reality is they won’t be included in the talks. The “holy grail,” so to 
speak, of these talks is a denuclearized Korean peninsula and 
normalization in one of the hottest areas in which we have a strategic 
interest. I don’t think that this administration is willing to put the 
human rights on the table for fear that it may scuttle a nuclear deal.66 
Although, as others have pointed out, we’re not going to be able to 
have a long-term sustainable nuclear deal or sustainable relationship 
with North Korea with these ongoing starvations, mass killings, and 
mass torture. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But, if there was a hierarchy of U.S. national 
interests at play here, wouldn’t you say denuclearizing North Korea is 
way more important than achieving human rights for the people of 
North Korea? That that comes into play maybe a few years down the 
line after we’ve accomplished the more important goal? Could you 
make that argument? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: Sure. Certainly from an American perspective, the 
biggest threat is the nuclear threat. But if we’re talking about the 22 
million North Koreans that are living under this repressive regime, 
there are a separate set of strategies that need to be pursued. I would 
just add, and I agree with almost all that Paul said, that human 
 
64. Talking Foreign Policy: Jesner v. Arab Bank, CASE WESTERN RESERVE 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVD3Yify380&list=PLOWPmlciK
6gkZI-Xfuk0oBc9a3aRX2WMd&index=3&t=66s. 
65. Maya Salam and Matthew Haag, Atrocities Under Kim Jong-un: 
Indoctrination, Prison Gulags, Executions, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/world/asia/north-korea-human-
rights.html. 
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Administration and International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 431 
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rights isn’t something that Trump has expressed much interest in.67 
Even prior presidencies, the Obama administration, the Clinton 
administration, and even George Bush – those were administrations 
that put a lot of emphasis on human rights. But if you go back and 
look at the agreements that they struck with North Korea, you never 
see the words “human rights.”68 So, it’s certainly a tool we can use, 
but if you go back, to echo what Paul said, when push comes to 
shove, what we’re focused on, what we really need to prioritize is the 
denuclearization.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Shannon, you’re an ethicist. How does this 
strike you? 
 
SHANNON FRENCH:  Well, I mean, one of the overall issues here is 
whether or not this is like negotiating with terrorists. And, as I think 
about that, and think about what’s on the table here, we’re talking 
about a bad actor who has not shown any signs of improving any of 
his actions. Now, we have to be realistic to some extent. There’s 
always a point—at least, we hope there will be a point—with most 
rogue or even terrorist regimes where they try to make a transition to 
be a legitimate political power. And finding that exact moment isn’t 
easy. And one of the trickier aspects of diplomacy is recognizing when 
the time is right for such a transition.  Think about, for example, 
when the United Kingdom decided to start doing quiet negotiations 
with Sinn Féin and the IRA.69 But, if you begin down that route you 
have to realize it can’t be something that is a quick, early, public 
move that seems to legitimize the other party before they’ve begun to 
show improvements.70 And frankly, if we again look at history, the 
better approach seems to be to bring in third parties and have some 
early framework done where you stand off with some moral high 
ground to say “I can’t talk to them, obviously. But hey, my friends 
over here are going to quietly talk to you and see if you’re serious 
about making real change,” and build very slowly. I worry deeply, as 
an ethicist, about what kind of message we might be sending, not just 
to North Korea, but to the entire world, if we say “Oh! You want to 
talk? Well bygones. We’re not going to worry about anything you’ve 
done before. Let’s see where we can get from this point.”   
67. Id. 
68. Gramer & Tamkin, supra note 2. 
69. James F. Clarity, Sinn Fein is Invited by Britain to Join New Peace 
Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1997), 
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70. David S. Jonas, The New U.S. Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty: Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way out of 
the Wilderness?, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 597, 646 (2006).  
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MICHAEL SCHARF: But at least the Trump administration’s 
position seems to be: “We will talk, and if you do not do what we 
want, then we will use force,” as opposed to past presidents that have 
said, “We will talk with you, and we will buy your cooperation with 
economic assistance.” There were agreements that we reached with 
North Korea by past administrations, where we gave them billions of 
dollars in economic assistance in return for their promise, which they 
didn’t keep, to get rid of the nuclear weapons.71 Which of those two 
approaches do you think is more ethical? One where you tell them, 
“behave or we will hurt you” or one where we say, “We will make 
your lives very, very, good if you behave?” 
 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I’m not a huge fan of either, because they’re 
both ways of negotiating with rogue or terrorist States. And I come 
back to the idea that they shouldn’t be given a seat at the table, until 
they make some moves and concessions. So, all of this is backwards. 
We’re starting with the, “If you will start to do something then these 
are the following consequences,” instead of just saying, “We’re going 
to sit here and wait for you to do something positive. Then, and only 
then, will we do anything meaningful.” And I would like to say that, 
even as I put that out there, that I don’t count as something positive 
some of these showy, but ultimately meaningless, moves by North 
Korea. Like the blowing up of these testing sites that can be 
reconstituted or might not be needed or were damaged anyway.72 
That’s meaningless. That doesn’t impress me much. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, lets return to you to talk about the full 
range of carrots in the U.S. arsenal of negotiations. In addition to just 
throwing money or threatening force, what other kinds of things are 
North Korea looking for with respect to a final peace negotiation? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, one of the things that is quite often forgotten 
is the North Koreans are quite interested in the reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula. Now, when we hear this we think, “Well, why 
would they be interested in reunification? That would simply be the 
south reincorporating the North to its dynamic capitalistic society 
and democratic structure.” But the North actually thinks it could 
govern all of Korea and could incorporate the South Koreans into the 
 
71. Glenn Kessler, Fact-checking President Trump’s Claims about the North 
Korea Deal, WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), 
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regime structure of the North.73 It’s also about being a regional 
strategic player. At the moment, Kim is isolated. He’s the one that’s 
seen as the bad actor. But he sees a deal with the United States as a 
way of bringing him tremendous political power and prestige in the 
region. And I think that’s been under appreciated. And in particular, 
returning to Tim’s point, if he gets a summit, if he gets to sort of do 
the foxtrot with the United States, it’s of huge value. So, you blow up 
a few old labs and launch platforms, you say yet again that you’re 
going to denuclearize, and you get to go to Singapore for a summit 
and get a photo op. That’s going to add huge domestic and regional 
influence for Kim. And then there’s economic issues.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Tim, Paul was talking about the reunification idea. 
This is not just the North’s idea. South Korea also very much wants 
reunification, isn’t that correct? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: Well, South Korea wants to reunify along the South 
Korean model.74 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, what if they decide to go ahead and 
negotiate a reunification structure? Could the U.S. block it? Should 
the U.S. block it? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: No, the two Korean leaders could negotiate a 
reunification. But then they would be looking to the Americans to 
pay for it. It would be hugely expensive to bring the North Korean 
economic infrastructure into that of South Korea, and a huge drain on 
the South Korean economy.75 So, we couldn’t block it, but we’d have 
to pay for it.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, and then there are other aspects to this. The 
U.S. has a lot of troops in South Korea to protect it from the North.76 
 
73. Kongdan Oh, Understanding North Korea, BROOKINGS (Apr. 1, 2013), 
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Would the U.S. have to pull those troops out as part of the 
agreement? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: The North Koreans are very clear that they want the 
American troops to leave in exchange for denuclearization.77 And the 
Americans are very clear that having our troops there is crucial to our 
military strategic interest, both on the Korean peninsula as well as in 
that part of Asia. It’s one of those catch 22s that is exceedingly 
difficult to navigate during negotiations. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well it’s time for another short break. When we 
return, we’ll talk about what the details of a negotiation between the 
U.S. and North Korea would look like, and what’s at stake if the 
Summit is permanently shelved.  
---- [Station break] ---- 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf, and we’re back with 
Talking Foreign Policy. I’m joined today by some of the foremost 
experts on negotiating with rogue nations. We’ve been talking about 
the prospects of a U.S.-North Korean Summit. In this final segment of 
our broadcast, I want to ask our experts what advice they would have 
for the negotiators if, there was, in fact, a North Korea summit? But 
before we talk about what should be on the negotiating table, I’d like 
to ask Asian Affairs expert, Tim Webster, who should be at the 
negotiating table? You had mentioned earlier that China and maybe 
Russia should play a part. Why? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: I’m not sure I would say Russia. I hope Russia is not 
invited to the party. But I think China, as the economic, security, 
and military guarantor of North Korea, has to be there. North Korea 
doesn’t exist without the economic lifeline of China. Whether you’re 
talking about trade, loans, investment, North Korea has to have 
China support to survive.  And I think you also need to have South 
Korea at the table. At the end of April, North Korea and South 
Korea signed something called the Panmunjom Declaration,78 and 
they said “Look, going forward, these talks will either be three 
party—North Korea, South Korea, U.S.—or four party—North Korea, 
South Korea, U.S., and China.” So, we need to understand that the 
South Koreans obviously need to have a seat at the table for this to 
 
77. Id. 
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succeed. I think what’s gone unnoticed, at least in this country, is all 
the quiet backstage maneuvering that the current South Korean 
President, Moon Jae-in, has done to get us this far. So, if there is a 
summit it didn’t come about because Trump talks big—it was made 
possible because South Korean President Moon Jae-in has been 
working like a madman. You know, go back to the Olympics and the 
impressive diplomatic coup de tat he pulled off by having the South 
and the North on the same team together, for the women’s ice hockey 
team, and inviting North Korean leaders down to participate in the 
ceremonies. Those efforts I think, and even coming to Washington to 
council President Trump earlier this week, are what made the 
difference. So, South Korea, of course, needs to be at the table. It 
wants denuclearization as well, but as we talked about, there are a 
whole range of other issues South Korea would want to address in 
these kinds of talks.79 I think four-party talks involving those four 
actors are probably the best. I think Russia is going to be a spoiler. 
Six-party talks also included Japan. There is a role, I suppose, for 
Japan here.  In previous manifestations, Japan has played the role of 
economic advisor.80 Japan would be there to fund the peaceful nuclear 
reactors that North Korea would ultimately get. But I think either 
three- or four-party talks are really the way to move forward on this.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Paul Williams in the last three years you’ve 
been shuttling back and forth to Geneva for the peace talks regarding 
Syria, and those peace talks are multi-party talks. Based on that 
experience, what can you tell our listeners about the pros and cons of 
bilateral talks versus the multi-party approach? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, bilateral talks are a lot easier, you can control 
half of the agenda, you can control half of the negotiations because 
you’re one of two parties. When you need to develop a strategy, you 
only need to get your team to come to an agreement on that strategy 
which, as we’ve seen with the preparations for this potential summit, 
it’s exceedingly difficult just to get your own team, your own 
secretary of state, your own national security advisor, to agree upon 
what are your priorities, what’s the negotiation process going to look 
like. Tim’s right, you do have to involve the Chinese, probably the 
Japanese, definitely the South Koreans, but that makes it exceedingly 
difficult, because it’s essentially the North Koreans on one side 
negotiating with the four other members across the table, and that 
makes it much more difficult to get to “yes” and to get to “yes” 
effectively where your priorities are on the table, because the Chinese, 
 
79. Suzy Kim, Crossing Borders: A Feminist History of “Women Cross 
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the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the Americans don’t all have 
the same priorities.81 They do big-picture—denuclearization82—but in 
terms of a number of the other issues, there’s complete disagreement 
between the Americans and definitely the Chinese,83 and there is even 
daylight between the U.S. position and that of our allies the South 
Koreans and the Japanese.84 So, it’s going to be complicated enough, 
and that only makes it more multi-dimensional. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, when you’re talking about complicated peace 
negotiations, how all-important do you think it is that the negotiating 
team have a lot of experience? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well it’s…  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Do you think that’s a loaded question? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: That’s a loaded question. This is not the same as 
negotiating a real estate deal. I think this is part of the dilemma that 
we’re facing here is we have a president who is very effective at a 
certain type of negotiation and a certain process and that’s what 
they’ve, you know, the tweets that you read earlier, the let’s go mano 
a mano, let’s meet in Singapore, let’s hash something out, that’s how 
you buy a hotel; it’s not how you denuclearize a country. I think what 
we’re going to have to have, and I think there’s people on the team 
that can do this, is a clear set of priorities, a clear understanding of 
the timeline. It could take several years of intermediate steps to 
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denuclearize the Korean peninsula;85 it won’t happen quickly. And 
you’re going to need a very detailed follow-on negotiation process, we 
keep talking about the summit, the two folks getting together and 
hammering something out beyond just shutting down the reactors.  
What do you do with the existing nuclear material and missiles, and 
then who’s going to pay for it? The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
with the U.S.S.R. cost the Americans two billion dollars to help the 
Russians get rid of some of their nuclear weapons, and it has cost 
another half a billion over the last ten years to monitor.86 Are we 
going to pay for this? 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, how difficult do you think it makes for 
successful negotiations that the U.S. doesn’t currently have an 
ambassador to Korea, there’s no current U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asia and the Pacific, there’s no State Department 
expert on North Korea, that person just retired, I believe there’s no 
arms control expert—a big chunk of the experts who normally would 
be involved in these kinds of negotiations have not been appointed.87 
How difficult is that going to make successful negotiations? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Okay, let’s be honest, this is a real test of President 
Trump’s mantra of “we’ve been getting it wrong before, there’s a new 
sheriff in town, we’re going to do things differently.” So if you were to 
list off these positions to the top officials on the Trump team they’d 
shrug their shoulders and say “yeah, yeah, but those are the guys, 
those are the positions, those are the institutional interests that 
brought us the last twenty years of failed policy in North Korea; we 
need fresh ideas, we need a new dynamic, we need a new process.” I 
think we’re going to find that it’s not as easy as just bringing in a 
new team with fresh ideas, that the depth of knowledge that’s 
required to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is substantial, and 
without that knowledge, and I think this recent sort of push back or 
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this abrogation of the summit is an example of that, it’s like, wow, 
this actually is more complicated than just negotiating over Twitter. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well we do have John Bolton. Now, let me remind 
the listeners about John Bolton, he is someone with a lot of 
experience during both the senior and younger Bush administrations; 
he was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, 
he was Ambassador to the United Nations, and he was Deputy 
Secretary of State.88 So this is a man with a lot of experience that has 
now been made the new National Security Advisor to the President.89 
Any of our panelists, what do you think the entrance of John Bolton 
into this calculus means? Tim? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: Sure, so another fact about John Bolton is during his 
time with the younger Bush administration, the U.S. presented 
evidence to the world that North Korea was not abiding by the 
framework that the Clinton administration had agreed to in 1994, and 
John Bolton rather triumphantly said “aha, this is the hammer I have 
been searching for to destroy this agreement.”90 So John Bolton is the 
guy on the Bush Team who killed the first North Korea deal that had 
been in place at that time for eight years. So you have that aspect, 
you also have his comments last week about aspiring to a Libya 
model.91 We already talked about what happened to Muammar 
Gaddafi earlier in the program, we don’t need to revisit that, but that 
wasn’t a particularly helpful way to advance discussions with North 
Korea, especially given North Korea’s support for Gaddafi at the 
time.92  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: In a way, you’re being almost too diplomatic in 
describing this. I think that one could say that John Bolton’s 
statements about the Libya model fueled the response of Kim, which 
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directly led to the President’s announcement on May 24th that he 
was pulling out of the talks.  
 
MILENA STERIO: It started with John Bolton but then also Mike 
Pence had said some things about that, basically referring to the 
Libya Model which, from the North Korean perspective, is certainly 
not a good model because, again as I explained earlier, although you 
could make the argument that Gaddafi in 2003 agreed to a regime of 
inspection and verification, and perhaps even abided by the terms of 
that deal, ultimately there was a regime change in Libya, his regime 
was toppled and this resulted in his death.93 So if you’re North Korea 
you’re looking at this, you see that people like John Bolton and Mike 
Pence are referring to this, you certainly would not be rushing to a 
summit in Singapore.94 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But wasn’t this actually a giant misunderstanding? 
Pence, I think, described it one way, but that’s not really what 
Bolton meant by the Libya model, is it? 
 
MILENA STERIO: I think Bolton was actually referring just to the 2003 
agreement where Libya actually agreed to dismantle its weapons of 
mass destruction.95 So, I think Bolton was looking at it as like, this 
can actually be done, this was done once before and an authoritarian 
regime agreed to essentially destroy its arsenal. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And then it was Pence who then spun it and said 
this means if you don’t comply, we have a regime change, and that 
got things off.96 
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MILENA STERIO: Exactly, and that’s when the North Korean Vice 
Minister for Foreign Affairs called Pence stupid and ignorant, and 
then this basically sparked Trump’s response to say this is now 
cancelled.97 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, if I could just jump in real quick, I think 
this highlights some of the concerns that those of us around the 
microphone have been expressing. I think Bolton made a serious effort 
at saying yeah, there’s a Libya model; in 2003 they agreed, by 2004 
the Libyans were shipping the components of their weapons program 
to the United States in exchange for economic inducements and 
economic trade,98 and that was actually working. Completely separate 
from that, there was the 2011 revolution in Libya, which led to the 
regime change and the killing of Gaddafi by his own people. I think 
Bolton was essentially saying “look, if we are going to do this, here’s a 
roadmap,” and then others in the administration who didn’t actually 
grasp what had happened in 2003-2004 heard Libya, “regime change, 
yeah let’s go that model.” And now we have, as Milena laid out, it’s 
falling apart. Because the core team did not understand that there are 
two parts, that there’s a Libya model for denuclearization and then 
there’s the Libyan revolution—completely different, completely 
unrelated. That lack of sophistication has crippled, at least in the 
short-term, what was going to be a summit to denuclearize the 
Korean Peninsula. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But maybe not, everything the President tweets or 
says today doesn’t mean it’s going to be his position tomorrow. Paul, 
isn’t it possible that this is just another bargaining ploy by President 
Trump and that we’ll be back at the table maybe not on June 12th, 
but soon thereafter? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: It’s not a bargaining ploy, it’s stalling for time. I 
think there was a realization that this is exceedingly complicated, 
that shockingly, our team, Team America, is not prepared for this, 
and that the misunderstanding and recriminations have created an 
opportunity to basically pause and get our act together. The North 
Koreans have been preparing for this bilateral engagement for a really 
long time. We’ve been preparing for two weeks, and this gives us a 
couple more weeks maybe to prepare and come up with an actual 
plan. 
 
97. Noack, How Kim-Trump Tensions Escalated, supra note 93. 
98. Barry Schweid, Libya Ships Nuclear Parts To U.S., CBS (Feb. 20, 2004, 
1:51 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/libya-ships-nuclear-parts-to-
us/. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Talking Foreign Policy: North Korea Summit 
263 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, so there’s some optimism that this is not 
the end of the talks. Shannon, let me go the other route, though, with 
you and do a thought experiment. What do you think would happen 
if the talks are permanently cancelled?  
 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I think first of all, as we’ve already 
experienced, we’ll see a return to very angry rhetoric on both sides, 
but the other things that I think that will happen most likely, South 
Korea isn’t going to just give this up, so South Korea will probably 
try to restart the negotiations with the North and perhaps play off 
what has happened with the US as a way to come closer to the North 
or make some arrangements there. We’ll probably see more nuclear 
testing by Kim Jong-un as again a way of acting out in response to 
that, but there are other things we can expect, like a decline in U.S.-
China relations, even further. And one thing that I’m aware of from 
my travels to Japan is there has already been a lot of increased 
political pressure in Japan to amp up their move towards rearming99 
and they’ve even started talking about how quickly could they 
become nuclear.100 In light of that kind of a breakdown, and Japan is 
already feeling a sense of insecurity around whether they are truly 
protected anymore by the U.S., I think it would be reasonable for 
that worry to reemerge, that Japan is going to say, look we can’t 
count on anyone, we need to make sure that we have that precious 
nuclear umbrella, too.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, let’s take this scenario to the extreme. 
Shannon you’re the author of a book titled The Code of the 
Warrior.101 Let’s assume that things go off the rails completely, as 
Milena said there’s maybe a legal argument the U.S. can make for use 
of force, and if we do use force, what does that kind of military 
engagement look like, what are the casualties likely to be? 
 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well this is where it gets truly horrific, and I 
think that Secretary of Defense Mattis made the point with a single 
word; he said that if we got into a military conflict with North Korea 
it would be “catastrophic.”102 But just to make that real, there are the 
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obvious targets -- barracks, troop concentrations, artillery, nuclear 
facilities, command and control, all of that can be predicted.  But 
what we need to talk about is the human cost, and in late 2017, the 
Department of Defense itself did an estimate of what that human cost 
might be, and it estimated as a very conservative number around 
twenty to thirty thousand dead per day.103 As high as six figures have 
been discussed.104 There are 100,000 Americans in South Korea, both 
military and civilian.105 So what we’re talking about here in real 
human terms is, to make a local reference, within ten days the 
equivalent of the population of Cincinnati would be dead. This cannot 
be a light decision.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, so with that in mind, I’m much more 
optimistic that we’re going to end up seeing the two countries get 
back to the peace table.  
 
SHANNON FRENCH: I certainly hope so.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This may be, as Paul said, just a stall while the 
U.S. gets its act together. Tim, if these talks are eventually held, 
what do you think the benchmarks for gauging their success should 
be? 
 
TIM WEBSTER: Obviously we need to have some plan that lays out 
with admirable detail the steps towards complete denuclearization. 
That’s a very long, multiple stage process, but something that spells 
out step-by-step, U.S. does this, North Korea does this, U.S. does this, 
North Korea does this, and so on and so forth. And I think the clearer 
the picture you have of what each step means, the likelier you are 
that both parties will actually fulfill that. We’ve had an agreement 
before with North Korea in 1994, as I mentioned, but immediately 
after it was signed, you had the Republican revolution, you had Newt 
Gingrich coming into town, and everybody including John McCain 
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criticizing Clinton for going ahead with it.106 So, if we can have some 
agreement on what the steps will be, a timeline perhaps, or some 
other very clear roadmap that spells out how we get to complete 
denuclearization, that I think is what we should be looking for, and 
then, of course the other bugbear here is the implementation itself, 
and as Paul mentioned, it would be a many year timeline, and it’s 
difficult, I think, for our politicians to think along those long 
timeframes.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well the stakes could not be higher for the 
eventual U.S.-North Korea Summit, which I think we all hope will 
eventually take place. We need to wrap up our program now. Paul 
Williams, Shannon French, Milena Sterio, and Tim Webster, thank 
you all for providing your insights about the prospects and pitfalls for 
a summit between the United States and one of its oldest adversaries. 
I’m Michael Scharf, you’ve been listening to Talking Foreign Policy.  
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